Media Capture and the illusion of balanced coverage

By Praise Aloikin Opoloje

Uganda’s media landscape appears open and diverse on paper, with numerous radio stations, TV channels, newspapers, and online outlets claiming independence and pluralism. However, in reality, it is tightly controlled through a mix of political ownership, pressure from regulators, reliance on government-linked advertising, and widespread self-censorship among journalists and managers.

Radio remains the primary source of news for most Ugandans, especially in rural areas. Studies cited by the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) indicating that between 80 and 89 percent of Ugandans rely on radio as their primary source of information.

A significant number of radio stations, particularly those broadcasting in local languages, are owned by government ministers, members of the ruling National Resistance Movement, (NRM), Members of Parliament, or businesspeople closely tied to the ruling party. This ownership creates uneven coverage, topic and self-censorship by employees, with opposition politicians and critics often receiving less airtime, shorter interviews, and tougher questions, while ruling party voices receive more favorable treatment especially around elections.

The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), the regulatory body, has been accused of using licensing and enforcement to target independent or opposition-leaning media. For instance, in 2020, the UCC directed all radio stations to reapply for licenses on short notice, creating fear among stations that they might lose their licenses before the 2021 elections.  This followed public complaints from President Museveni that some stations were giving too much airtime to opposition figures. Similarly, ahead of the 2026 elections, most media houses had expired licenses and denied renewal.

Other examples of regulatory pressure include:

• Selective suspension or temporary closure of stations seen as too critical, especially during election periods
• Requirements for broadcasters to pre-submit political talk-show topics, guest lists, or scripts during sensitive times
• Withdrawal or redirection of government advertising away from outlets that give substantial space to opposition views
• Public warnings from senior officials about “inciting” content, often followed by regulatory inspections, fines, or license reviews.

These pressures encourage self-censorship among journalists and outlets, who learn to stay within the boundaries to survive. The result is a media landscape that appears free and varied but delivers coverage that consistently advantages the ruling NRM while sidelining opposition voices, particularly during elections.

Government advertising is also a key source of revenue for many media outlets, and stations that give too much space to opposition views risk losing these advertisements. Human Rights Watch reports highlight cases where stations charged opposition candidates higher fees for airtime, likely to offset the risk of angering the government or make it harder for the opposition to afford airtime. In this kind of environment, self-censorship isn’t just occasional; it becomes the everyday, sensible choice for survival.

 Journalists who spoke to Human Rights Watch and the Uganda Journalists Union talked about ongoing intimidation: arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, and court cases brought under broad, vague charges like “incitement,” “computer misuse,” or “offensive communication.” HRNJ reports show that local officials such as Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), police commanders, and security, often influence what gets covered, especially when it involves opposition figures. The result, backed by a 2019 study in the International Journal of Communication, is that journalists shift toward “safe” topics and deliberately steer clear of anything politically risky. This happens most strongly outside Kampala, where pay is low, job security is weak, and there’s little institutional backup to protect reporters who push boundaries. 

The media imbalance is most pronounced during elections, where the ruling side is given unlimited, zero-cost exposure, while opposition voices are limited or interrupted. Internet and social media shutdowns also create information gaps, making it difficult for citizens to access alternative sources of information. A 2021 ACME, media coverage report of the 2021 elections, opposition figures like Robert Kyagulanyi (Bobi Wine) and Kizza Besigye had to pay millions of shillings for short talk-show slots or ads. In contrast, President Yoweri Museveni could deliver long “national addresses” on topics like infrastructure projects, security updates, or attracting investors and broadcasters were legally required to air them for free. 

Even when opposition candidates managed to pay for airtime, their access was often undermined by sudden disruptions. 
Human Rights Watch documented how, during the 2021 campaign, opposition radio appearances in places like Hoima, Jinja, and Mbale were cut off mid-broadcast and blamed on “technical failures,” “power outages,” or “transmitter issues.” These interruptions frequently lined up with pressure from local authorities, especially in areas where stations were owned by NRM-linked people. 

To listeners in rural areas tuning in, it didn’t look like deliberate censorship; instead, it made opposition figures seem unprepared or unreliable, while the government’s uninterrupted messages kept dominating the airwaves. 

The framing of stories in Uganda’s media significantly influences public perception. According to Human Rights Watch, during the 2021 elections, opposition rallies were often portrayed as chaotic or violent, while state responses were justified as necessary to restore order. State-aligned outlets, including the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, used sensational headlines like “Police Battle Rioters” or “Security Restores Order” to describe opposition events. 

This narrative shift portrays peaceful protesters as threats to society and security forces as protectors. When opposition voices raised concerns about corruption, joblessness, or human rights, they were often dismissed as “foreign-funded attempts to destabilize” the country, undermining legitimate criticism.

The government has also employed internet and social media shutdowns to control the narrative, as seen during the 2021 elections when a five-day nationwide blackout was imposed. This tactic limits opposition organizing and citizen reporting, allowing state-controlled media to dominate the narrative.

Similar patterns emerged ahead of the 2026 elections, with reports of online criticism arrests, bans on live broadcasting, and restrictions on scrutiny. These measures tighten control over the narrative, making disputed election results appear credible.

Uganda’s media system appears open and pluralistic but quietly blocks real competition. Reports from ACME, Human Rights Watch, and HRNJ show opposition voices are made expensive, interrupted, or spun negatively, often through ownership ties, rule application, financial pressures, and fear of consequences.

Elections are shaped long before polling day, in a media landscape that guides voter perception and narrows choices, ensuring the ruling side stays dominant.