By Praise Aloikin Opoloje
Uganda’s general elections on January 15, 2026 unfolded amid severe digital restrictions and systematic suppression of civil society actors, casting serious doubt on the transparency and integrity of the process. The communications regulator, Uganda Communications Commission (UCC), imposed a nationwide internet shutdown starting January 13, blocking public internet access, social media platforms, messaging apps like WhatsApp, web browsing, new SIM registrations, and outbound data roaming.
The Executive Director together with the police described these steps as essential to prevent misinformation, electoral fraud, incitement to violence, and the “weaponization” of digital platforms. In reality, the measures curtailed independent monitoring, real-time reporting, and public scrutiny, favoring the incumbent, Yoweri Museveni.
In the days before polling, restrictions extended beyond connectivity. Widespread arrests targeted opposition supporters, while journalists endured physical assaults, equipment seizures, threats, and revocation of accreditations, pushing many toward self-censorship and reliance on slower channels like Short Message Service-SMS. In October 2025, the Nation Media Group and the Daily Monitor Newspaper were barred from covering parliamentary sessions and State House events involving Museveni.
Several civil society organizations including the Alliance for Finance Monitoring (ACFIM), Chapter Four Uganda, Human Rights Network for Journalists-Uganda (HRNJ-U), the National NGO Forum, and the National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders had their operations suspended. Election observers and party agents were denied entry to polling stations and tallying centers, severely limiting verification of ballot integrity, voter turnout, and results transmission. By sidelining these independent watchdogs, the state minimized challenges to official accounts of events.
Global and regional groups raised alarms. The #KeepItOn Coalition, representing over 345 organizations opposed to internet shutdowns, urged President Museveni to restore connectivity, arguing that such restrictions violate human rights, delay accurate results, and distort democratic participation. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights condemned the curbs as threats to freedom of expression, association, and assembly. Domestic and international election monitors highlighted how politically motivated arrests and digital blocks undermined oversight and eroded confidence in the outcomes.
On election day, Ugandans voted largely offline. Traditional media, including state-run Uganda Broadcasting Corporation and select radio stations, continued broadcasting, but journalists struggled to verify incidents or report reliably amid heavy security presence and access barriers. Unsubstantiated claims of ballot stuffing, malfunctioning biometric voter kits, abductions, and voter suppression spread through word-of-mouth and SMS. Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi (Bobi Wine) of the National Unity Platform alleged widespread interference and questioned the process’s credibility. Fact-checkers like PesaCheck encountered major hurdles in rapid verification due to the information vacuum, while delayed official communications allowed rumors including manipulated AI-generated content, such as unverified claims about Kyagulanyi’s safety to proliferate and heighten tensions.
On January 17, the Electoral Commission announced Yoweri Museveni the winner with 71.65% of the vote, against Kyagulanyi’s 24.72%. Partial internet restoration began later that day, enabling some general access by 18 January. Full nationwide connectivity, including social media, was only restored around 26 January after what authorities called “technical and security assessments.”
These lingering controls hampered post-election efforts: opposition claims of fraud, ballot irregularities and intimidation, could not be independently verified or widely circulated in real time. Civil society responses remained constrained, prolonging uncertainty and allowing misinformation to solidify into entrenched narratives. The disruptions extended beyond politics, digital businesses and mobile money services suffered losses, citizens faced communication barriers, and journalists could not fully monitor safety or integrity concerns.
Uganda’s approach in 2026 exemplifies digital authoritarianism, where governments exploit control over online spaces to consolidate power. By pairing internet restrictions with repression of journalists and civic actors, authorities fostered conditions where misinformation flourishes and accountability weakens. Though justified as safeguards for public order and against disinformation, the measures deepened information asymmetries, undermined institutional legitimacy, and intensified public mistrust in elections and governance.
Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, documented patterns of repression, violence, and an uneven playing field. The opposition rejected the results outright.
In conclusion, rebuilding trust demands ending arbitrary digital controls, safeguarding civic space, and committing to transparent electoral processes. Absent meaningful reforms, information suppression risks becoming a standard tool, eroding democratic prospects in Uganda.
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