By Praise Aloikin Opoloje
The Protection of Sovereignty Bill risks concentrating dangerous levels of power in the hands of a single Cabinet Minister. By placing almost every aspect of civil society organizations under the direct control of the Executive, the Bill threatens the delicate constitutional balance known as the separation of powers, the principle that prevents any one branch of government from becoming too powerful. In an ideal democracy, Parliament makes the laws, the Executive implements them, and the Judiciary acts as an independent referee. This Bill dangerously blurs those lines.
Article 99 of the Constitution gives executive authority to the President, but that authority must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and the law. The Sovereignty Bill stretches this authority far beyond reasonable limits. Under the Bill, no organization may operate as an “agent of a foreigner” without registering with the Minister under Clause 14. To register, groups must disclose detailed information about their structure, funding, staff, and activities, and even provide “any other information” the Minister may require (Clause 15). The Minister may then investigate their “suitability” in almost any manner he or she considers appropriate, including demanding information from other government agencies (Clause a16).
Even after registration, the Minister retains sweeping powers. Certificates are valid for only two years, may be issued subject to whatever conditions the Minister chooses, and those conditions may be changed at any time (Clauses 17 and 18). More troublingly, the Minister may suspend or revoke a certificate on broad grounds such as “security threats” or “disruptive activities,” and may even create new grounds through regulations (Clause 20). The Minister also controls foreign funding above a certain threshold (Clause 22), requires regular detailed financial reports (Clause 26), and may appoint inspectors with wide powers to raid offices and seize documents (Clause 28). Several clauses further empower the Minister to make regulations that effectively expand the law without returning to Parliament. In short, the Minister becomes gatekeeper, investigator, rule-maker, enforcer, and judge all in one.
This concentration of roles is the Bill’s most serious constitutional flaw. First, the Minister is granted quasi-legislative powers. By allowing the Executive to create new grounds for punishment and prescribe detailed rules through regulations, the Bill shifts real law-making authority away from Parliament, which is constitutionally vested with that power under Article 79.
Second, the Minister exercises quasi-judicial functions. Deciding whether an organization is “fit and proper,” whether it poses a “security threat,” or whether its activities are “disruptive” involves determining legal rights. These are decisions that should be made by an independent court with proper procedures and the right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed under Article 28. Instead, one politician is allowed to play judge.
Third, the Bill gives the Executive unchecked enforcement power. Inspections, information demands, and sanctions may all occur without prior court approval. The coercive power of the state is therefore exercised administratively rather than judicially. When one office makes the rules, enforces them, interprets them, and punishes breaches, the separation of powers collapses. What remains is not regulation, it is control.
Power this broad and discretionary is rarely exercised neutrally. In practice, it becomes a tool for targeting organizations the government dislikes. Critical voices, human rights groups, or opposition-linked initiatives could face endless delays in registration, sudden revocation of certificates, repeated inspections, or funding blocks. Courts have previously struck down laws that grant such unfettered discretion to the Executive over fundamental rights because they invite abuse, as reflected in Human Rights Network Uganda & 4 Others v Attorney General (2020). Even the limited right of appeal to court under Clause 18(3) offers little real protection. By the time a court hears the matter, an organization may already have been crippled, especially since certificates last only two years. Executive action comes first; justice comes later, if at all.
It is time to rethink the Bill because it does more than regulate foreign influence. It restructures how civil society exists in Uganda by placing it under the near-total discretion of a single Minister. In doing so, it undermines the very constitutional principles meant to protect Ugandans from arbitrary power.
If the Bill is to survive constitutional scrutiny, it requires fundamental changes:
- Registration and oversight should be handled by an independent body, not a political Minister.
- Suspension or revocation of certificates should require prior court approval.
- Vague terms such as “fit and proper,” “security threat,” or “disruptive” must be replaced with clear, objective standards.
- Ministerial regulations should be strictly limited and subject to proper parliamentary oversight.
Without these safeguards, the Bill does not protect sovereignty, it erodes constitutional democracy. It replaces the rule of law with the rule of the Minister. Uganda deserves better.
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