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Part 2: KCCA moves from Kiteezi tragedy to Buyala disaster

In the weeks after a section of Uganda’s largest garbage dump site at Kiteezi near the capital Kampala collapsing and killing dozens of people and displacing hundreds, Kampala’s streets began to choke under the weight of uncollected garbage. 

With the Kiteezi garbage dump closed, the garbage was hastily diverted to temporary dumping points but these too quickly reached their limits.

By February 2025, KCCA announced what it called a turning point: the acquisition of 230 acres for a new landfill in Buyala, in Mpigi District near Kampala. At a reported price of 70 million shillings per acre, the deal came with bold assurances.

“Our waste management solutions are going to resonate with current times,” the Executive Director, Sharifah Buzeki, said.

The promise, however, was troubled from the outset as the Buyala site was immediately engulfed in controversy. Environmentalists and residents protested that the designated area lay squarely in a wetland called Mayanja. Soon, a National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) report confirmed the worst fears: it said the vast majority of the land was a wetland, with only 1.5 acres deemed suitable for a dumpsite.

At the point of announcement of the Buyala land purchase, according to KCCA’s Director of Public Health, Dr. Sarah Zzalwango, only 15% of the purchase price had been paid. Despite the findings and warnings about environmental damage by NEMA and others, however, the purchase was completed and waste disposal began almost immediately.

New landfill, old habits

Dr. Zzalwango admits the move to Buyala bore all the hallmarks of crisis management rather than careful planning. “The way we moved to Buyala was in an emergency state,” she told Agora. “So we continued to do the same dumping style as in Kiteezi.”

And despite assurances by Buzeki that KCCA would introduce waste management solutions that resonate with current times, the KCCA approach at Buyala mirrors exactly the very operational patterns that contributed to Kiteezi’s collapse: no segregation of waste, no leachate treatment, and no methane management. Authorities have continued to go about waste management in a careless manner, sparking concerns another Kiteezi-like disaster could unfold.

By the time the Kiteezi landfill collapsed on August 09, 2024, the authorities responsible for Kiteezi management had long known about the impending danger, according to government internal memos seen by Agora.

The memos shared with Agora by officials at KCCA reveal a chain of warnings stretching back months before the disaster happened.

In one memo of April 19, 2024, the Acting Supervisor for Landfill Management formally warned the Manager of Solid Waste Management of the “critical nature” of Kiteezi. By then, the Minister of State for Kampala, the area MP, the Lord Mayor, and the Mayor of Kampala Central had all visited the site. Senior KCCA management had also been briefed. His memo listed visible dangers including instability of waste mounds, erosion of road embankments, damage to underground pipes, and risks of “fatalities in cases of bag instability.”

The memo recommendation was unequivocal: decommission Kiteezi, upgrade leachate treatment, capture landfill gas, and close final cells with relocation to new land for future use.

On June 30, 2024, the Officer for Landfill Management reported that there was “critical waste mass movement, a blocked main drainage channel and a depleted area of work.”

By then, Shs3.71 billion of the landfill’s budget allocation had already been spent on stop-gap measures; warning signs, extra equipment, murram backfill, and culvert construction.

On July 02, 2024, the Director of Public Health and Environment took the emergency to KCCA’s top management, requesting an additional Shs1 billion.

A parallel report from the Deputy Director of Strategy confirmed cracks had developed, prompting what was described as “budget-neutral interventions.” These included a public awareness campaign to alert waste pickers and nearby residents. But the Legal Affairs memo admits: “No evidence was availed.”

Chronic funding gaps

Today, as in the days leading to the Kiteezi disaster, KCCA officials are bickering with the Ministry of Finance over funding shortfalls. 

KCCA’s Director of Gender, Dr. Sarah Zzalwango, told Agora this month that the city this year requested Shs30 billion for waste management and Shs9 billion for decommissioning Kiteezi but they have gone unanswered by the Ministry of Finance. The central government, she says, insists KCCA first prepare detailed statements of requirements for competitive bidding. The authority has long lacked a budget line for decommissioning Kiteezi, she said.

Today, as in the past, the central government appears determined to leave the KCCA garbage handling budget to donors. In July, KCCA announced a new $1 million (Approx. Shs3.1 billion) UN-Habitat grant from the Government of Japan to stabilise seven acres of the high-risk landfill. The work, meant to last the next eight months, targets methane-heavy, leak-prone areas at risk of eruption.

KCCA has a history of underfunding its waste management. Annual requests for Shs150 billion in 2019/2020 FY were met with allocations as low as Shs2.96 billion. Even in 2023/24, Parliament approved only Shs3.03 billion of a requested Shs305.5 billion — with Kiteezi’s closure repeatedly deferred.

Internal planning documents had long confirmed the site had exceeded its design capacity and that new facilities in Ddundu, Mukono district were suggested. Yet, Ddundu remained on paper, and no action for an alternative landfill was taken until it was too late.

In a maze of bureaucracy and delay, KCCA had even contracted Price Water Coopers back in 2002 to develop a disaster management plan. As of the collapse, only a “draft report” existed.

 “Financial constraints and other impediments” had hampered its completion according to internal memos.

Meanwhile, the landfill continued to operate, cracks widening and risking the lives of hundreds of waste pickers and community members in the neighbouring settlements.

KCCA told Agora that its long-term vision for Buyala includes: a material recovery facility to sort and add value to recyclables, dumping only the residue, waste segregation at the source — encouraging households to separate organic, recyclable, and residual waste before it leaves the home and partnerships with mapped entrepreneurs who will buy segregated waste for processing.

But for now, the reality is far from the promise. Waste continues to arrive mixed and unprocessed, dumped on contested land that environmentalists argue should never have been sold for landfill use.

How to spot fake news

Fake news is nothing new, but bogus stories can reach more people via social media than what good old-fashioned viral emails could accomplish in the years past. A lot of these viral claims aren’t “news” at all, but fiction, satire and efforts to fool readers into thinking they are for real….

Managing the cost of disinformation

Why countering the threat requires media houses to inspire and innovate

There are signs that news gathering around the 2025-26 general election is likely to be fast-paced, social media-driven, dangerous, and packed with disinformation, misinformation and mal-information.

The disinformation around the 2021 general election in Uganda was big and it is likely to be bigger this time. Numbers regarding volume and value are scanty for Uganda, but according to the website Statista in 2020, taking into account the spread of fake-news in the financial, political and healthcare fields, the total cost of misinformation and the spread of fake news was $78 billion. This includes money spent on for-hire advertising, marketing and public relations companies dedicated to manipulation of online opinion.  

That means media houses will have to set-up dedicated disinformation desks and assign journalists to fact-check, get online and refute disinformation. As they do that, media houses must be aware that it is going to be costly. This is largely because the amount of energy needed to refute disinformation is an order of magnitude bigger than is needed to produce it, to paraphrase a famous line attributed to Alberto Brandolini, an Italian programmer.

According to Pyrra, an American organisation dedicated to making the internet, and the world, safer by protecting people from harm – online and off, before it switched from fact-checkers to community notes contributors, Facebook was paying big money. In 2017 it reportedly paid $100,000 to Snopes, which was among the first fact-checking organisations in the world. In 2018 it paid $406,000. It also paid FactCheck.org $188,881 in 2018 and $242,400 in 2019.

Fact-checking in Uganda is struggling to get a grip. Efforts by independent organisations such as the Debunk Media Initiative supplement work by for hire freelance fact checkers. That means serious media houses determined to make a difference will have to set up dedicated fact-checking desks. That will mostly mean adding overhead costs to already struggling entities.

Globally, many newspapers have had disinformation beats and fact-checking desks for some time. Factcheck.org was formed in 2003 in the newsroom of the then-St. Petersburg Times, in America. At that point, fact-checking had been around for about a decade. Today, the French international news agency, AFP, prides itself with developing the most extensive fact-checking network in the world. In 2024, it published 7, 536 fact-checks or about 20 every day.

When Duke Reporters’ Lab at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, USA, tracked the growth of dedicated fact-checking globally, it found that there were 151 organisations in 2015 and 424 in 2022. That’s a 180% jump in the number of dedicated fact-checking globally in seven years.

Fact-checking requires dedicated organisations, practicing professionals, tools of the trade, and codes of ethics, regulatory groups associations, and more. Fact-checkers must go through mountains of correct information, to ensure one falsehood does not slip through. Imagine watching video, after video, image after image, or reading text after text in a fast-paced environment. 

In the context of the 2026 election, the disinformation eco-system is likely to be robust. It will churn out fake photos, montages, videos, and stories to create false perception of the reality before voters. 

Disinformation will be created in backrooms and specialised disinformation labs. It will be published and shared on social media, websites, digital blogs and other platforms. It will go viral in memes, be adopted by mainstream media, circulated by internet influencers, and re-echoed by candidates and their campaign surrogates at rallies, debates, and interviews. 

Researchers from the MIT Sloan School of Management in 2018 found that false news spreads more rapidly on the social network X than real news does — and by a substantial margin. Equally, significantly, the scholars found, the spread of false information was not mainly by bots that are programmed to disseminate inaccurate stories. Instead, false news spreads faster around X due to people retweeting inaccurate news items.

A study by the University of Southern California in 2023 found that the biggest influencer in the spread of fake news is the social platforms’ structure of rewarding users for habitually sharing information. The researchers found that just 15% of the most habitual news sharers in the research were responsible for spreading about 30% to 40% of the fake news.

This disinformation viralisation can be traced to 2006 when Facebook added the “share” button. It sparked a spiral in propaganda campaigns, legitimate political advertising, and even for-profit troll farms were working their way through an increasingly opaque, algorithmically driven social media ecosystem.

This period presents both legacy media with both predicament and opportunity. Although costly and sluggish compared to the fast-paced world of AI, Chatbots, and social media, a focus on time-tested journalistic processes presents the best path to successful election coverage for legacy media houses. It will ensure they maintain audience trust through transparency, accuracy, fairness, and yes – objectivity (the neutral reporting of “just the facts”).

Legacy media houses and their digital affiliates could deploy their brand appeal as purveyors of election coverage that is bereft of slanted interpretation and biased opinion. They could stamp their authority as sources of ethical journalism by covering the elections as a contest of opposing ideas and personalities in a space crowded with blogs, websites, and social media peddlers of so-called engaged journalism that abjures neutrality as a value. Every masthead and byline must become a mark of unbiased facts, informed analysis, and transparent process. News articles must bear information about the authors, their expert credentials and their values.

At every opportunity, legacy media must coach their audiences to differentiate disinformation, which is false information intentionally shared to mislead, and its cousin; mal-information, which is true information intentionally shared to mislead, from misinformation, which is false information inadvertently shared with no intention of causing harm.

Disinformation is not always a lie or fabrication. It can be the truth deployed to mislead or mixed with lies and fabrication. Members of the public must be told to check the source of the information and query its purpose. Some disinformation is designed to create distrust, hopelessness, apathy, disengagement, and uncertainty about the election. Members of the public plagued with these feelings will not participate in the process.

Media houses face major hurdles because they must be equipped to detect every mode of deepfakes. AI-generated videos and images can look very genuine. Sorting the gem from the garbage can be tough work, especially if the fact-checkers do not have the skills or technology. The ideal deepfake detection tool would be multimodal; able to detect fake video, images, audio, and text. There are fewer tools to detect audio deepfakes. This is mainly because these are more difficult to detect.  

The deep fakes detecting tools are mainly for video-fakes.  To detect deep fakes, it is no longer enough to manually look out for and spot glitches and inconsistencies in videos. There are now deepfake detection tools. The fakers are ahead as the fact-checkers play catch-up, but they continue to get better.

Media houses will need deep ‘behind the scenes’ teams to intervene at least at two points; first down-ranking to screen content before it goes live, moderate content early, and make suspect content less visible. Two is deplatforming or removing rogue information and its purveyors from media platforms.

It helps to know that disinformation thrives on at least four weak points in the communication perception loop. First, disinformation thrives because it is crafted to be catchier than true news. It is designed to spark emotional reactions such as excitement, anger, fear, frustration, and more. Secondly, these emotions propel people to act on the disinformation with investing time and energy to check whether the news they are exposed to is true or fake. Thirdly, when disinformation is spread by many sources, each encounter creates a confirmation bias that it must be true. Fourthly, in a circular reporting model, one source publishes misinformation, which is picked up by more and more outlets in an echo chamber of falsehood.

Effective fact-checking must, therefore, be counterintuitive. It must involve skepticism about catchy breaking news, emotional detachment, avoiding confirmation bias, and verifying before reusing or sharing.