By Praise Aloikin Opoloje
The sustainability of civil society depends fundamentally on access to resources. Clause 22 of the Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 threatens this reality by capping foreign funding at 20,000 currency points (equivalent to UGX 400 million per year ) and requiring ministerial approval for any amount above that limit. Presented as a defence of national sovereignty, the provision risks becoming a sophisticated tool for silencing independent voices through financial control.
Article 29(1)(e) of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution guarantees every person the right to freedom of association. This right is meaningful only if associations can raise and use funds effectively, whether for public interest litigation, environmental protection, healthcare in remote areas, or monitoring governance.
Clause 22 undermines this right in two critical ways. First, the funding ceiling is unrealistically low for organisations operating at scale. Second, it converts a constitutional right into a discretionary privilege granted by the Minister. When civil society actors must seek executive permission to access resources, genuine independence is eroded.
The Constitutional Court has previously cautioned against laws that grant unfettered discretion to officials in matters affecting fundamental rights. Subsection (4), which allows the Minister to prescribe vague procedures, risks creating precisely such a regime. Although the provision does not explicitly ban advocacy, it controls the resources that make advocacy possible. By restricting funding, the State indirectly determines which organisations can operate effectively and which must shrink or disappear.
Organisations engaged in human rights, anti-corruption, and government oversight already operate under pressure. The risk of delayed approval, denial, or forfeiture of funds under Clause 22(3) encourages self-censorship. Furthermore, the threat of up to twenty years’ imprisonment under Clause 22(2) transforms even minor compliance issues into existential risks. This is not neutral regulation; it is regulation by fear.
Article 43 permits limitations on rights only if they are acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. While protecting sovereignty from undue foreign influence is a legitimate aim, Clause 22 fails the proportionality test. The arbitrary cap lacks evidentiary justification, and the prior-approval mechanism is more restrictive than necessary. Criminalising financial flows with decades-long prison terms is especially disproportionate for what is essentially a regulatory matter.
Uganda is not acting in isolation. Over the past three decades, more than 130 countries have introduced restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs, ranging from burdensome registration to outright bans and stigmatizing “foreign agent” laws.
In recent years, this trend has accelerated. In the Americas, countries such as Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela have adopted or tightened anti-NGO laws between 2024 and 2025. These measures impose excessive reporting obligations, require prior authorisation for funding, and levy heavy taxes on foreign grants.
El Salvador’s 2025 Foreign Agents Law, for example, requires organisations receiving foreign funding to publicly label themselves and pay a 30% tax, prompting some prominent human rights groups to shut down. In many cases, such measures are justified in the name of national security or sovereignty but primarily serve to delegitimise critics and shrink independent civic space. CIVICUS reports that only about 40 out of 198 countries currently enjoy open civic space, while 81 are rated as repressed or closed.
Like the laws in El Salvador, the bill seeks to use foreign funding as a proxy for control, framing external resources as inherently suspicious. The low funding threshold, ministerial approval requirement, and severe penalties mirror tactics seen in other jurisdictions where governments have successfully reduced the operational capacity and legitimacy of independent organizations.
While many countries target NGOs specifically, the Bill’s potential impact extends beyond civil society. Its implications for routine banking transactions, credit lines, and private investments risk broader economic disruption, an issue already flagged by the Uganda Bankers Association. The low cap of UGX 400 million could capture ordinary financial flows, creating compliance challenges and deterring legitimate investment.
In both the global trend and Uganda’s case, the result is the same: independent voices are starved of oxygen while the State gains the power to determine which causes can thrive. The difference is that Uganda’s provision, if enacted, could simultaneously weaken civil society and harm the wider economy.
In a democratic society, the State should not decide which voices can afford to speak. If Clause 22 is enacted in its current form, Uganda risks joining a growing list of countries where “protecting sovereignty” becomes a pretext for shrinking freedom.
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