By Praise Aloikin Opoloje
Every election cycle in Uganda is wrapped in development language. Roads are launched, funds disbursed, and public officials are hyper-active. Money circulates. But a persistent question remains: whose resources are these, and what’s the real purpose?
For many Ugandans, election legitimacy is undermined by public resources being used as partisan campaign tools. Service delivery becomes political mobilisation and patronage.
Timing as Evidence
Major government activities repeatedly cluster around electoral moments. Parish Development Model (PDM) disbursements are made. Development promises are made. Presidential donations multiply. Ministers, Resident District Commissioners, and security officials “monitor” projects in constituencies where electoral contests are tight.
It is the same state that routinely shelves urgent public services for “lack of funds” but suddenly locates vast sums for electoral mobilisation. That contrast reveals a political economy in which elections attract resources more reliably than public need. The timing here, is thus, a strategy.
The Law and the Space it Leaves Open
Section 82 of the Presidential Elections Act criminalises public officers’ involvement in political campaigns. Section 66 defines bribery broadly, covering money, gifts, or any inducements intended to influence voter behaviour. The same act prohibits the use of public resources to solicit votes or support for a candidate
However, the law has weaknesses. Ministers and office holders are permitted to use facilities “ordinarily attached” to their offices for official duties, but “execution” is undefined. The ambiguity lets campaigning pass as governance. In practice, those in public office can mobilise using state resources while remaining formally within the law’s elastic boundaries. Opposition actors, lacking access to state infrastructure, operate under an uneven terrain from the very start.
Trucks, Buses, and the Visibility of Power
In many parts of the country, public vehicles—including those of security apparatus—can be seen transporting supporters to NRM campaign rallies. The same vehicles perform a different function when the opposition mobilises. They arrive to dismantle gatherings, arrest organisers, and intimidate participants.
Everyone acknowledges this imbalance, and in the lead-up to elections, it is not uncommon to hear the conclusion drawn aloud: there is no way Museveni is going to lose an election with the full machinery of the state at his disposal.
The Political Branding of Public Programs
Perhaps the most consequential development has been the deliberate branding of state programs as ruling-party achievements. The Parish Development Model, Operation Wealth Creation, and infrastructure projects are framed as NRM initiatives rather than public services funded by taxpayers.
PDM was integrated into the NRM manifesto, and its implementation is overseen by local committees often dominated by party-aligned actors. Reports persist of beneficiaries being prioritised based on political affiliation, while opposition-leaning citizens face delays or exclusion. The President himself has linked access to PDM funds to political loyalty, presenting support for the ruling party as a condition for economic security.
For communities trapped in poverty, the message is clear. Access to state programmes is conditioned on visible loyalty to the ruling party. Development is presented not as a right, but as generosity, and the expected return is political obedience.
Patronage, Money and Manufactured Consent
Money has always played a role in Ugandan politics. What has changed is its scale and normalisation. Vote buying, inducements, and direct financial mobilisation have become defining features of elections. Political loyalty is increasingly purchased rather than persuaded.
This monetisation erodes accountability. When voters are swayed by immediate financial survival rather than policy choices, elections lose their deliberative function. When billions are mobilised for campaigns while essential services remain underfunded, public trust collapses.
Funding sources, especially for the ruling party are opaque, and usually undeclared. This leaves the public to speculate, often concluding—reasonably—that state resources are underwriting party campaigns.
That perception blurs the distinction between state and party until the two appear indistinguishable.
Disinformation and the IIlusion of Popularity
This system is further sustained by narrative. The ruling party’s reach is framed as organisational superiority. Its dominance is presented as organic popularity. Opposition struggles are attributed to incompetence rather than constraint.
This is disinformation by omission. It conceals the structural advantages of incumbency: control of security forces, access to public funds, command over local administrators, and the ability to mobilise state programs for political ends.
A young party operating under constant disruption is compared, dishonestly, to a forty-year incumbency embedded in every layer of the state. Civic space is criminalised for challengers, while mobilisation is institutionalised for those in power.
Accountability Deferred
Who is supposed to stop this? The law points to the Electoral Commission, the police, Parliament, and the courts. Each has, in different ways, failed to act decisively. Enforcement is selective, oversight is weak and there are no consequences for abuse. All bodies have been compromised.
The result is impunity. And impunity reshapes expectations. It teaches citizens that public resources belong to those who hold power, not to the public. It teaches politicians that the line between governance and campaigning is negotiable. It teaches challengers that fairness is not forthcoming.
Recognising Patronage as Capture
Government projects are not inherently partisan. But when their timing, branding, and distribution align consistently with electoral interests, they cease to be neutral. They become instruments of political capture.
Selling patronage as development is among the most effective campaign tools available to incumbents. It converts rights into favours, votes into transactions, and elections into managed outcomes. It preserves the appearance of democracy while draining it of substance.
A democratic future cannot be built on such foundations.
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