By Praise Aloikin Opoloje
While the goal of protecting national sovereignty is understandable, Clause 28 raises serious concerns. It grants inspectors appointed by the minister sweeping powers to enter premises, demand information, and impose heavy penalties for non-compliance. This risk clashing directly with Article 27 of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution, which protects every person’s right to privacy.
At its core, Clause 28 allows an inspector to enter any premises linked to an “agent of a foreigner” at a reasonable time and request any information needed to enforce the Act. The definition of “agent” is broad enough to cover NGOs, businesses, community groups, and even ordinary Ugandans receiving diaspora support. Refusing access, providing incomplete details, or causing delays can lead to up to seven years in prison or a hefty fine. What begins as routine oversight quickly feels far more intrusive.
Article 27 of the Constitution is clear: no person shall be subjected to unlawful search of their person, home, or property, nor unlawful entry onto their premises. It also protects against interference with privacy, correspondence, communication, and property. Clause 28 appears to stretch these protections to breaking point in three main ways.
First, it authorizes warrantless entry. Constitutional practice in Uganda, as in many democracies, generally requires a court-issued warrant based on reasonable suspicion before authorities intrude into private spaces. By allowing inspectors to enter without judicial approval, the clause bypasses this important safeguard and opens the door to arbitrary inspections.
Second, the power to demand “any information” is dangerously open-ended. Sensitive financial records, donor lists, internal emails, beneficiary data, and personal communications could all fall under scrutiny. This directly affects the privacy of correspondence and communication safeguarded by Article 27(2). Without clear limits on scope or relevance, inspections risk becoming fishing expeditions rather than targeted oversight.
Third, the heavy criminal penalties create a chilling atmosphere. When people fear that saying no, or even making a minor mistake, could lead to years in prison, they are far less likely to challenge abuse of power. The burden then falls on the inspected party to prove a lawful excuse, which is often easier said than done.
Any limitation on fundamental rights must pass the test set out in Article 43(2) of the Constitution: it must be acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. Protecting sovereignty is a legitimate aim, but Clause 28 struggles to meet the tests of necessity and proportionality. Less intrusive options, such as written requests for information, regular audits, or court-supervised processes, could achieve the same goal with far less damage to privacy.
The clause also lacks basic safeguards: no requirement for prior notice, no independent oversight, no clear rules on how data will be stored or protected, and no simple mechanism for affected parties to challenge unfair inspections. Uganda’s Data Protection and Privacy Act exists, yet Clause 28 makes no effort to align with it.
In practice, this could have wider ripple effects. Civil society organizations, businesses working with international partners, and even families relying on remittances might self-censor or scale back activities to avoid trouble. A climate of constant surveillance risks eroding public trust, discouraging civic engagement, and harming economic confidence, especially in a country where diaspora support and foreign partnerships play vital roles.
Uganda’s Constitution was designed to strike a careful balance between state power and individual freedoms. Clause 28, in its current form, tips that balance too far toward unchecked executive authority. To respect constitutional principles, the provision needs meaningful reform: mandatory judicial warrants for intrusive searches, strict limits on the type of information that can be demanded, procedural protections such as notice and appeal rights, and clear integration with data protection rules.
Sovereignty matters, but it should never come at the expense of the very rights that define a democratic society. Without stronger safeguards, Clause 28 risks turning the Bill into a tool of surveillance that undermines the privacy and freedoms Ugandans hold dear under their Constitution.
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